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SUMMARY
As the structure of consumer preferences plays a crucial role in the analysis of differentiated product markets,
estimation of demand systems is a sensitive task. This paper contributes to this project in two ways. First, we
develop a method to deal with the simultaneous choice of an equipment and a level of usage. This question is
crucial for durable goods. Second, our method is suited for surveys of households, i.e., micro data. The main
feature of our method is to specify a direct utility function, which provides correct substitution patterns among
products at the aggregate level, i.e., compatible with the intuition. Applied  the market of telephone
equipment for households, our approach is also able to deal with two classical problems encountered in the
empirical IO literature on differentiated product markets, i.e., price endogene ty and dimensionality of product
sets. A distinguished feature of our study is that we provide an estimate of product shares in terms of the whole
stock of telephones rather than in terms of total sales in a given period. From a marketing point of view, this is
a useful information since stock shares measure the effective penetration of a brand over its lifetime. Finally,
we also provide markups assuming that firms follow Nash strategies.
RESUME
Cet article est une contribution à l’analyse des marchés de produits durables et différenciés. Le modèle
économétrique traite simultanément les décisions d’usage et de choix d’équipement. Dans ce cadre, est donnée
une réponse aux difficultés généralement rencontrées en économie industrielle appliquée : l’endogénéité d s
prix, la dimension de l’ensemble de choix et la structure du sentier de substitution entre produits. A partir de
données individuelles sur le marché du téléphone, le modèle fournit une estimation du stock et des ventes de
téléphones. Enfin une hypothèse de comportement stratégique permet de calculer des taux de marge par modèle
de téléphone.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Product differentiation is a common feature of competition in most consumer goods markets.
Not surprisingly it is an important topic in theoretical industrial organization since Hotelling
(1929), Chamberlin (1933), and more recently Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
Two issues of competition mainly concern the theoretical research: The strategic pricing under
differentiated products and the choice of products in oligopoly. (See Tirole, 1989.) These
questions motivate a growing empirical research. Besides the question of selecting the relevant
concept of conduct that is an essential step toward a correct measure of market power, a major
focus of the recent empirical literature is the estimation of unrestrictive demand systems.
Indeed, it is a quite sensitive task as the structure of consumer preferences plays a crucial role
for defining the equilibrium type that could be reached in models of product differentiation. It
is also a challenging problem as it involves dealing with the dimension of the commodity set
which can be very large.
This paper contributes to this project in two ways. First, we develop a method to
estimate a demand model for consumer durable goods, namely telephones. The distinguished
aspect of our approach is to deal with the simultaneous choice of a product and a level of
usage, a question that has not been often addressed in previous econometric studies on
differentiated product markets. In our view, this question is crucial for dealing with durable
goods. Second, our method is suited for surveys of households, i.e., for micro-data, and
provides adequate and practicable solutions to the main issues raised by the econometric
analysis of this type of markets: Price endogeneity, dimensionality of product sets, and
correctness of substitution patterns. The following review of the literature is aimed at clarifying
these issues.
In applied industrial organization literature, most studies use aggregate data for which
two approaches are applied: Estimation of demand systems and estimation of discrete choice
models. As proponents of the first approach, Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994) estimate a
multitiered system of demand, justified on the assumption of multistage budgeting and the
theory of price indices. This method considerably reduces the number of parameters while
obtaining a good approximation of the working of the market. In direct relationship with
marketing practice, which identifies step by step the different tiers on a market, the method is
adequate for transactional data recorded at the store level from scanners. In this approach, the
endogeneity of prices could matter. The supply side tells us that prices are correlated with the
unobservable product characteristics as part of the disturbance terms of demand equations.
This correlation may be not negligible since, even at the lowest tier, data are aggregated. The
authors take into account this situation at the estimation stage by using instrumental-variable
methods. Note that here the supply side plays no structural role.
Alternatively, Berry, Levinshon and Pakes (1995) favor the theory of random utility
and develop a full method based on the estimation of market shares defined from a discrete
choice model. Already the theoretical literature had recognized the advantage of discrete
choice models to study differentiated product markets. (See Anderson, De Palma and Thisse
(1992) for a review of these models.) Well suited to deal with the dimensionality problem, this
approach requires some care when specifying stochastic assumptions in order to avoid unduly
restrictive patterns of substitution among goods. In particular, modeling interactions between
product characteristics and non-observable individual characteristics is particularly crucial.
However, this is not sufficient to obtain good estimators as stressed by these authors. The
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supply side and the market equilibrium cannot be neglected for estimating aggregate industry
models.
Goldberg (1995) notices that the use of micro data for fitting a demand model alleviates
the question of the endogeneity of prices. First, an individual consumer cannot alter prices.
Second, micro data (i.e., data collected at the individual level) should permit to envision a high
degree of product differentiation and to seize the heterogeneity of consumer behaviors. Hence,
supply side considerations can be postponed until one turns to the study of the industry
equilibrium. Precisely, an aggregate demand can be consistently recovered from the estimated
individual demands as micro-data allow us to obtain the distribution of individual
characteristics, and so to monitor the aggregation process. The only critical task left to the
econometrician is to achieve a correct estimation of individual demands.
In the case of durable goods, the analysis can be performed by means of discrete choice
models, for which the nested multinomial logit model is an adequate tool. It is simple to
estimate and it escapes from the effect of the assumption of independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA). Indeed, if this assumption is maintained within each nest, it is relaxed in
between. However, this approach can be criticized on different grounds. First, there is some
adhockery in choosing the different nests, even if they correspond to common sense or expert
assessment. Second, this logit-type model remains generally based on linear indirect utility,
which is restrictive. Third, in consumer surveys, the observed discrete choice is often
completed by an information on the usage of the durable good. For instance, one observes both
the type of housing ownership and the size of dwelling, the type of car and the average annual
mileage, the choice of an heating system and the power consumption, etc. Separating the two
choices, the discrete choice on the durable product and the continuous choice on its usage, lies
on some separability assumptions that are sometimes unrealistic. Dubbin and McFadden (1984)
for the case of electric appliance, and Goldberg (1998) for the case of automobile, specify a
nonlinear indirect utility function that allows recovering discrete and continuous choices.
However these authors focus mainly on the continuous choice.
Consider now the telecommunications demand. It involves access to the network and
telephone usage that are clearly interdependent and cannot be separated. Even if a consumer
does not make calls, he or she may be willing to have access just for the option value of a call
in case of emergency.1 Note that access to the network requires a device or an equipment, here
a telephone which is a durable good. Now, many examples show that traffic and equipment
allowing for network access are interrelated in the telecommunications industry. For instance,
because of the overwhelming success of Internet, producers of microcomputers are introducing
simpler machines just equipped with the function of accessing and searching on the web. The
emerging information economy requires network equipment capable to offer access to a large
range of services and to transfer various types of information like voice, data, or images. In
part, habit formation and new usage may be the spring of technical changes on equipment.
More generally, the consumption pattern of a consumer informs us on his private valuation for
the equipment. Understanding the relationship between product choice and usage is at the
heart of business and marketing strategies, like product introduction, positioning or pricing
strategies.
By several specific features, the household telephone equipment (HTE) market is a very
stimulating field of investigation. This market is characterized by a high degree of both
horizontal and vertical differentiation of products. Marketing studies usually identify four
distinct segments on the French market: one-block phone, two-block phones, phones with
                                            
1 See Wolak (1993) on modeling telecommunications demand.
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answering devices, and cordless phones. Within a segment, products are likely to be
horizontally differentiated. In this context, providing realistic elasticities of substitution is a
sensitive task. Moreover, as in other European countries, the French HTE market presents two
further dispositions which raise interesting economic questions. First, during the eighties, this
market has evolved from a monopoly, the historic telecommunications operator France
Telecom, renting few telephone sets to a free-entry market where few firms (the majors like
Philips, Matra, Alcatel, and some smaller companies) sell a large variety of telephone models.
Note that the incumbent not only keeps renting but also sells many different types of
equipment. The convergence to a new equilibrium as well as the effect of ownership type
(renting or buying) must receive some attention, which we do in the empirical part of our
study.
A survey made in 1992 on a representative sample of French households allows us to
observe the choices of telephone models, the telephone bill and several socio-demographic
variables on the individuals. Another marketing database provides the technical characteristics
and the price ranges of different telephone models. The number of models of telephone we
consider is about 160. However, since a household can enjoy more than one phone at home,
the number of combinations of models that it faces, is huge (more than 12500 if we restrict
attention to symmetric tuples). To cope with the dimension of the choice set, we apply a
procedure introduced by McFadden (1978) which consists of drawing a subset of alternatives
and performing the maximum likelihood on this subset after having corrected the choice
probabilities accordingly.
Finally, fitting a structural model, i.e., a model derived from a direct utility function, to
micro data for analyzing a market of differentiated durable goods turns out to be a fruitful
method. First, we are able to deal with the classical problems of the empirical IO literature on
differentiated product markets, i.e., price endogeneity, dimensionality of product sets, and
correctness of substitution patterns. Second, we provide an estimate of product shares in the
whole stock of telephones as the survey bears on the equipment of households and not on
recent acquisitions. From a marketing point of view, this is a helpful information since stock
shares measure the effective penetration of a brand over its lifetime. Third, considering that the
market solution is approximated as a Nash equilibrium, we derive markups at the product level.
The next section is devoted to the specification of a demand model for HTE, taking
into account the specific aspects of the HTE market. The econometric model and its estimation
are presented in section 3. Empirical results are discussed in section 4 and the analysis of the
market equilibrium is performed in section 5. Section 6 concludes and proposes a research
agenda.
2. A CONTINUOUS-DISCRETE CHOICE MODEL OF TELEPHONE DEMAND
2.1. Notations and definitions
Consider a household (or a consumer) who simultaneously chooses a telephone
equipment in a set E of alternatives which are precisely defined below, and a level of
telecommunications usage which is a continuous variable. This consumer is assumed to be
connected to the network and to own at least one phone.2
                                            
2 As about ninety nine percent of French households are connected to the network, there is no need to consider an outside
alternative composed with no telephone. In a standard discrete choice model, omitting the outside alternative implies the
unrealistic feature that aggregate demand for all brands or products remain unchanged due to a general increase in price.
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An alternative or a choice is an equipment composed with one or two brands of
telephone.3 An equipment is denoted by ( )kj, , j or k being a model of telephone. Note that,
without loss of generality, an equipment composed of one phone is treated as a two-phones
bundle, with one of the two telephones being the nil phon . A symmetry condition on the
structure of equipment is needed as we do not observe which component of the equipment
(i.e., j or k) has been bought first. Hence, the model does not differentiate between alternative
( )kj,  and alternative ( )jk, . (See however in Section 4 how the price of an alternative is
defined.) Finally, the set E  contains all mutually exclusive alternatives ( )kj,  comprising one
or two phones.
Consumer n’s preferences are translated into a conditional direct utility function, which
provides the utility level of using a level x of t lecommunications and a level z of numéraire,
conditional to holding the alternative ( )kj, . A modified version of the Blackburn utility
function, discussed by Hanemann (1984) and applied by Hobson and Spady (1988) for
analyzing the demand of telephone usage, serves to specify this conditional utility function as:
( ) ( ) njknjknjknnjknjknjknjk zhxxxzxUU ezyqbezqy ++++-+== lnln1,,,,, , (1)
where b  is a non-negative parameter of scale to be estimated, q n  is  heterogeneity index
(supposed to be strictly positive) which can be measured through observable characteristics of
household n, hn is the marginal utility of numéraire specific to household n, jky  is a quality
index of equipment ( )kj,  that depends on observable attributes of each component of
alternative ( )kj, , njkz  is a term aimed at measuring the individual valuation for quality, i.e.,
relating the taste of individual n for equipment ( )kj,  to observable variates, and e njk is a
random term which is not observed by the econometrician. Note that the quasi-linearity is a
fairly admissible assumption as telephone call patterns should not depend on the consumption
structure of other goods.
The household faces the budget constraint
px z y Fn jk+ = - , (2)
where p is the price of a call unit,4 jkF  is the cost of equipment ( )kj, , and yn  is the
household income over the period under study.
Here, the possibility of combining brands of telephone to set up an equipment avoids a similar drawback. In response to a
general price increase, the consumer could shift to an equipment composed of only one phone, when he/she used to own a
two-pieces equipment.
3 Restricting attention to equipment that has less than two telephones is not a strong assumption as the percent of
households having more than two telephones is very low.
4 Because of the tariff structure practised by the French operator, the cost of each call depends on the calling area and the
time-of-use. In fact, this tariff structure provides exchange rates between calls of different types. All calls performed by a
customer are aggregated in terms of a measurement unit of duration associated with a particular call, i.e., a specific
duration for a call on a particular calling area at a particular time of the day. The price p is the price for one unit of this type
of call. Note that, because of this tariff structure, the price per minute is an endogenous variable. In other terms, the
average expenditure on telephone calls is specific to the individual and depends on his calling pattern. In this context, the
demand model we present could be understood as the second step of the a full consumer program or as the result of a two-
stage budgeting analysis. In a first stage, the consumer decides for the total expenditure, px, on telephone usage and on the
composite good. The other stage is devoted to the allocation of this telephone budget to different types of calls and, to the
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The utility function (1) is strictly quasi-concave, continuous and smooth with respect to
x and z. On the one hand, it ensures that the conditional optimal level of telephone usage, *njkx ,
exists and is unique for the given discrete choice ( )kj, . On the other hand, the optimal demand
of the composite commodity, *njkz , is positive provided that income is large enough compared
to the value of consumption. Assuming that household n sel cts an alternative ( )j k, , the
optimal conditional level of telephone consumption is given by
( )[ ]phx njknnjk -= ybq exp* . (3)
Note that the telephone demand is always positive as long as nq is p sitive.
Individual heterogeneity enters the demand in two ways. First, due to the non-
monotonicity of preferences, the telephone consumption can reach a saturation level, which is
specific to the consumer, a realistic hypothesis in the case of telephone. This saturation level,
i.e., the total usage of telephone services that an individual is able to consume when the price
of telephone calls is zero, is given by ( )jkn ybq exp , a function of the heterogeneity index.
Second, another source of heterogeneity is introduced through the marginal utility of
numéraire, namely nh  (also called marginal utility of income herein). It is realistic that
individuals differ in their valuations of the exchange rate between the utility levels provided by
the telephone usage and the numéraire (i.e., French Francs). It allows us to discriminate
among the different consumption levels in terms of income levels, which turns out to be
empirically adapted to our context. (See section 4 paragraph 3.)
The optimal discrete choice can now be defined. Inserting equations (2) and (3) into
equation (1) yields the conditional indirect utility
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) njknjkjknnnjknnjknjknjknjknjknjk FyhphzxUV ezybb
q
ezqy ++-+-== exp,,,,, ** .(4)
Alternative ( )j k,  is chosen when
( ) ( )kjkjVV kjnnjk ,,, ¹¢¢"³ ¢¢ , (5)
which is equivalent to
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]njkknjnjkknjkjjkn
n
n
kjjk FFh
ph
eezz
q
bb
ybyb -+-+-³- ¢¢¢¢ ''''
exp
expexp . (6)
In other terms, equation (6) shows how the choice of an equipment results from an arbitrage
between quality and price. The higher (resp. lower) the saturation level, q n , and/or the less
(resp. more) the marginal utility of income, hn, th  more (resp. less) is the weight on quality
instead of the price.
allocation of the budget on the composite good. The result of the second stage can be aggregated to provide the quantity x of
call units purchased by the consumer.
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2.2. Stochastic assumptions and substitution patterns
The theoretical structure is completed with stochastic assumptions, which mainly drive
the properties of the econometric model. Assume that the econometrician does not observe all
variates explaining the consumer choices. The stochastic error, e njk, results from the
interaction among unobservable individual characteristics and unobservable attributes of
equipment alternatives. The first stochastic assumption is stated as:
ASSUMPTION 1: The random terms ( )e njk j k E n, , ," Î "  are independent and distributed
according to a Gumbel density function with scale parameter m  (the location parameter
being normalised at zero).
This assumption yields the multinomial logit (MNL, herein) model. (See McFadden,
1973.) The probability of selecting alternative ( )j k,  is obtained as
( ) ( )( )( )å Î¢¢ ¢¢
=º
Ekj kjn
njk
nnnjknjk W
W
FphPP
,
exp
exp
,,,,,
m
m
zyq , (7)
where njkW  is the deterministic part in njknnnjknjk yhWV e++º , and where ( )( ) Ekjjk Îº ,yy ,
( )( ) EkjjkFF Îº ,  and ( )( ) Ekjnjkn Î= ,zz .
As it is well known, these individual choice probabilities exhibit the property of
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), which simplifies estimation but imposes strong
restrictions on the substitution path among alternatives. Indeed, under IIA, the cross-elasticity
of the choice probability for alternative ( )j k,  with respect to any characteristic of an
alternative ( )¢ ¢j k,  is the same for all alternatives ( )j k,  such that ( ) ( )j k j k, ,¹ ¢ ¢ . In
particular, if the price of an alternative increases, then the choice probabilities of all other
alternatives increase in the same proportion. This result is restrictive in the sense that the
choice probabilities of similar alternatives (i.e., alternatives that provide similar level of utility)
should rise proportionally more than the probabilities of dissimilar alternatives.5
The counterintuitive result associated with MNL motivates several approaches, as in
Berry, Levinshon and Pakes (1995) or in Goldberg (1995). It also impels our method founded
on the specification of a direct utility function, which provides a reasonable substitution path
between products at the aggregate level, i.e., compatible with the intuition. Thanks to the
structure of the selected utility function, the following result obtains:
PROPOSITION 1: The elasticity of product j's market share with respect to price of any
product q is not the same for all j q¹ .
PROOF: See Appendix 1.
Three remarks shed light on this proposition. First, although the analysis bears on
equipment, the result applies to products, i.e., to brands, which are our primary interest. For
sake of completeness, Appendix 1 provides the computation of product market shares from
market shares of alternatives. Second, as in the usual logit model, the main reason for this
                                            
5 The intuition dictates that the higher the change of the choice probability of product B due to a price increase of product
A, "the closer" B to A.
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result comes from the interaction between the individual heterogeneity index, q n , and the
quality index, jky , on the one side, and between the marginal utility of numéraire, nh , and the
equipment price, jkF , on the other side. The higher the relationship between individual
characteristics and quality of a particular product, the higher the desire to select products of
similar characteristics. For instance, households living in a large house are keener to look for
cordless telephones. Third, this result just allows us to get rid of the harmful effect of the IIA
property. However, that estimated cross-elasticities are in conformity with the above intuition
remains an empirical issue.
The crucial assumption here is the independence of stochastic terms e njk. Relaxing this
hypothesis as in the nested multinomial logit (NMNL) or multinomial probit (MNP) models
indeed provides more flexibility in the substitution patterns among alternatives. However, on
the one hand, estimation of MNP models is computationally cumbersome and often not
practicable (even using simulation methods) when it involves integrals of very high order as
soon as the number of alternatives gets large. On the other hand, although the NMNL model is
much easier to implement, it heavily relies on the correctness of the selected nests (i.e.,
different segments of market). This question is particularly critical in our case where the
grouping of alternatives in a reasonable number of nests is not obvious. In addition, deriving a
nested logit from a general non-linear utility function and estimating it, does not seem to be a
simple task.
Berry, Levinshon and Pakes (1995) propose an alternative approach. Assuming that the
quality index is a linear combination of interactions between product attributes and private
valuations (which are random variables), these authors obtain a correlation among alternatives.
One advantage of this procedure is to derive individual choice probabilities, which do not
satisfy the IIA hypothesis. For estimating their model, Berry et alii integrates the logit
probabilities of choice over the vector of private values which, in their case, is of a relatively
small dimension.
A similar approach can be attempted in our case. However, introducing an
unobservable individual heterogeneity conflicts with our estimation method, which requires the
IIA to hold at the individual level. We leave this technical difficulty to further research.
Nonetheless, given that we deal with a rich set of micro data and observable individual
variables, adding an unobservable private valuation for quality has a limited interest and
increases the estimation cost (in terms of computation time, in particular).
It remains to specify the stochastic assumption on the continuous choice. As there is no
interaction between the level of telephone usage, x, and the unobservable attributes of the
chosen equipment in the specification of our random utility function, the optimal conditional
usage *njkx  defined in equation (3) does not depend on enjk. In our case, as the quality of each
equipment is well identified by a precise list of observable characteristics, unobserved attributes
should only be related to subjective elements, such as the perceived design of a phone by the
consumers. They could play a role in the decision to buy a particular model, not really on the
usage. In addition, when, as in Hanemann (1984), one admits an interaction between the level
of telephone usage and the unobservable attributes of the chosen equipment, the distribution of
usage (i.e., the conditional continuous choice) should depend on the attributes of all
alternatives which is not particularly realistic.6
                                            
6 There is a critical difference between Hanemann’s approach and our model. In his paper, the continuous and discrete
choices bear on the same commodity. For instance, he has clearly in mind the case of housing where the question is to
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However, the continuous decision is not deterministic for the econ metrician. As a
matter of fact, the household may report its telephone bill incorrectly.7 Let ~xnjk b  he reported
level of telephone usage if alternative ( )j k,  is chosen. It is related to the true level xnjk*
according to ( )nnjknjk uxx exp~ *=  with the following hypothesis:
ASSUMPTION 2: The random term u nn, " , has a normal density function with mean 0
and variance 2s .
Denote by
( ) ( )
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ ---
-=
2
lnln
2
1
exp
2
1
s
ybq
ps
f
phx
x njknnjk (8)
the density of the logarithm of observed usage conditional to the choice of alternative ( )j k, .by
individual n characterized by the vector ( )q n nh,
Summing up, equations (7) and (8), together with Assumptions 1 and 2, will constitute
the basis of our econometric model.
3.  ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
Implementing the maximum likelihood (ML herein) method in order to estimate the
model here involves two practical difficulties that arise from the features of the data set.8 First,
the number of alternatives is very large which makes the estimation procedure computationally
burdensome.9 The solution is to randomly draw a set of alternatives for each individual
according to some selection probabilities to be defined. Clearly, in order to reduce the
dimension of the choice set, the intuition is to select alternatives that are close to the observed
choice, i.e., we restrict the individual choice set to the most probable choices. Second, the
database does not allow the econometrician to always identify the chosen alternative. For some
individuals, we just observe a sub-group of alternatives in which the choice has been made.
This technical problem is addressed by "integrating" over the possible alternatives in the sub-
group. The solution we propose in order to deal with these two practical questions accounts
for the IIA property and allows us to predict the choice probabilities for each elementary
alternative of the choice set for any individual.
Consider a sample of N individuals, independently drawn from the French population
having access to the network. Each individual is labelled by n = 1,....,N. Denote by nx  his
decide the size together with the type of a dwelling. Here the joint choices refer to two different commodities: The act of
communicating with somebody else and the ownership of a phone.
7 The surveyed household may or may not provide its telephone bill to the interviewer. It may just answer with a rough
estimate, which is a first source of measurement error. Moreover, a second source of error can be introduced as we need to
approximate the annual telephone bill while the survey asks for the telephone expenditure during two-months.
8 The reader, who is not concerned by statistical techniques, could skip this section without altering the understanding of
the sequel. Nonetheless, this methodological section shows the practicability of our structural approach.
9 The large number of alternatives should not afraid a big computer! Nonetheless, the procedure we propose has the
advantage of producing efficient estimates while allowing the estimation of our model on standard PCs in a reasonable
time.
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observed level of telephone usage over the given period (measured in call unit with a
measurement error), by ( )nn kj ,  his chosen alternative, and by G  the vector of the parameters
to be estimated.
Conditionally to the exogenous variables (such as socio-demographic variables, classes
of income, attributes and prices of telephones), the likelihood for observation n is
[ ] ( )nknjknjnnn xPxkjl nnnn f=G;,, , (9)
i.e., given the stochastic structure of the model, the likelihood function is the product of the
marginal probability 
n nnj k
P  associated with the choice of equipment as in equation (7), and the
conditional probability of telephone usage ( )f
n nnj k n
x as in equation (8).
To cope with the large number of alternatives that an individual faces, we apply a
procedure initially introduced by McFadden (1978) and developed by Ben-Akiva and Lerman
(1985). Define for each individual n a selection probability ( )kjn ,,P  for each alternative
( )j k E, Î . Then alternatives can be drawn according to an importance random sampling. To
alternatives, which an individual would choose with very low (resp. large) probabilities, should
be imputed very low (resp. large) selection probabilities. In terms of efficiency, these selection
probabilities must be such that the ratio ( )kjnPnjk ,,P  varies as little as possible. An efficient
solution is to choose them such that ( ) njkPkjn ˆ,, =P , " =n N1,..., , ( )" Îj k E, , where $Pnjk is
a consistent estimator of the choice probability provided that the model is well specified.10
Note that this procedure is valid only when there is no alternative-specific parameter in the
model and the IIA property is verified. (See McFadden, 1978 and 1984).
Denote by Dn the reduced set of alternatives obtained from applying a sampling
procedure with replacement. Note that the chosen alternative is added to this set
systematically. The probability of obtaining the set Dn conditionally to the chosen alternative is
denoted by ( )nnn kjD ,Pr  and is computed according to the type of random sampling and the
selection probabilities. (See Foncel, 1997).
Now, an assumption is required for proving consistency of ML estimates when the
preceding procedure is applied to compute the choice probabilities. (See McFadden, 1978.)
ASSUMPTION 3: i) The sampling protocol satisfies the positive conditioning property, i.e.,
( ) 0,Pr >kjDn , ( )" Îj k Dn, . ii) It is fully specified with the property that ( ) 0,Pr =kjDn
( )" Ïj k Dn, .
In other terms, an alternative in Dn has a positive probability of being an observed
choice effectively, and could be assigned the set Dn by the sampling mechanism. Behind this
assumption is the idea that the knowledge and the relevance of selection probabilities allow us
to correct for the bias involved in the estimation of choice probabilities on a reduced set of
alternatives for each individual.
                                            
10 In order to obtain consistent estimates of the choice probabilities, a first run consists of applying the whole estimation
method using any selection probabilities. For instance a set of selection probabilities is easily obtained by allocating to each
alternative, a probability equal to the inverse of the total number of alternatives.
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Before modifying the likelihood function to account for this sampling process, one must
address a second problem. As mentioned above, in a few cases, we do not precisely observe
which alternative has been chosen. Instead, one just knows a subset of E in which the selected
alternative lies. The definition of these subsets is imposed by the database. There are M
subsets, ( )Em m M=1,..., , such that E Em
m
M
=
=1
U  and { }E E m mm mÇ = Æ " ¹ ¢¢ , . We observe
mnE , the class in which individual n h s selected an equipment.11
This problem of incomplete obs rvability of alternatives affects the selection process of
alternatives. Indeed, the selection set Dn should include all alternatives in mnE , instead of just
the observed chosen alternative. Each alternative ( ) mnEkj Î,  must belong to the same
selection set, Dn, in order to achieve consistency of estimators. Note that the probability of
drawing Dn has to be modified accordingly. (See Fonc l, 1997).
We can now derive the final expression of the likelihood function conditional to the
reduced set of alternatives.
PROPOSITION 2:
i) The modified log-likelihood of the sample is
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( )1 ,
,
exp Pr ,
ln
exp Pr ,
m f
m= Î ¢ ¢
¢ ¢ Î
é ù
ê ú
G = ê ú¢ ¢ê ú
ë û
å å åmn
n
N
njk n njk n
N
n j k E nj k n
j k D
W D j k x
L
W D j k
(10)
ii) Under usual regularity conditions, $G ( )= argmax
G
GLN  is a consistent estimator of G
0 , the
true values of the parameters.
PROOF: See Appendix 2.
Given regularity conditions, asymptotic normality is achieved. Note that the variance-
covariance matrix of parameters is the White matrix.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This section is devoted to the estimation of the model, which requires a preliminary
step consisting of building a bridge between the theoretical model and our data sources.
4.1. The data
A first database12 contains the responses to a survey realized in 1992 on a sample of
1500 households representative of the population connected to the French telecommunications
network. The survey provides a description of the household’s telephone equipment and the
                                            
11 To avoid the problem of not observing systematically the chosen alternative, one may aggregate alternatives. Then, we
would have to define the level of utility procured by these aggregate alternatives. This is not so obvious to do when the
indirect utility function is not linear in product attributes. Moreover, one can show that one is not able to recover the
estimated market shares of products, which is one of our main objectives.
12 The marketing institute DEMOSCOPIE, Paris, has provided this database.
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level of its telephone bill over two successive months of 1992.13 It also reports a lot of socio-
demographic variables, such as the number of individuals in the household, the job position of
the family head, the population density of the area where the household lives or the ownership
of a teletext terminal, and the income class.
The second database14 d scribes all the 134 models of telephone marketed in the survey
year, including their prices, their attributes and in particular their type. In 1992, marketing
analysts considered four market segments corresponding to four different types of telephone:
One-block telephone (referenced by the acronym OB) for which dialling buttons are located on
the listening part; two-blocks telephone (TB); cordless telephone (CD); answering telephone
(AW). The telephone type is used as an attribute in the empirical model. Other attributes are
for instance, the number of memories, the presence or not of a speaker or a screen to show the
numbers of incoming or outgoing calls. Further info mations about sales by brand and type of
telephone from 1988 (after deregulation) to 1992 are also provided. For each of these years,
the set of models and their attributes (including price) are reported.
Variables used in the empirical model are listed in Appendix 3 while descriptive
statistics on individual and product variables are gathered in Appendix 4.
4.2. Specification
Now we specify the heterogeneity index qn , the marginal utility of numéraire hn , the
quality index y jk , the cost of equipment F jk , and the private valuation of equipment njkz , in
terms of the observable variables.
The heterogeneity index
As this index is individual-specific and must be positive always, a classical specification
is to set
÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ å+=
=
Q
q
nqqn vcc
1
0expq , (11)
where ( )
Qqq
c
,..,0=
 are parameters to be estimated and nqv  is the vector of observable individual
characteristics q of household n. The selection of relevant socio-demographic variables is an
empirical issue.
The marginal utility of income
In order to differentiate the marginal utility of numéraire among individuals, we set
in
I
i
in ymh å
=
=
1
, (12)
where i I= 1,...,  indexes income classes (increasing with i), yin is a dummy variable which
takes value equal to one if the household's income belongs to class i or value zero otherwise,
                                            
13 If d
n
 denotes the telephone bill (expressed in French francs) of household n during two months, the annual level of
usage x
n
 is approximated by computing 6d p
n
with p=0.73 FF. We assume that any seasonal variation is included in the
measurement error of the equation of telephone consumption.
14 The marketing institute GFK, Paris, has provided this database.
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and ( )mi i I=1,..,  are unknown parameters to estimate. With a lower (higher) income class should
be associated a higher (lower) value of the marginal utility of income.
The quality index
This index is defined as kjjk yyy += , where jy  and ky  are the quality indexes of
each equipment component. We define
( )å
=
+=¢+¢=
L
l
kljllkjjk bbababa
1
y , (13)
where  ( ) ,..,al l L=1  are parameters to be estimated, and b bjl kl ( )  is the attribute l of telephone j
(respectively, k).15 In other terms, when a consumer owns two phones, one adds their quality
indexes to obtain the overall quality of his/her equipment. This linear specification could be
deemed too restrictive. However, our attempts to use non-linear expressions (quadratic form,
for instance) have not been successful so far. Note that all parameters associated with different
attributes should be positive since, ceteris paribus, quality should rise with a higher availability
of technical characteristics.
The cost of an equipment
As the model is cast in a static setting, the customer behaves as if he had to renew his
equipment decision at each period. However, since each element of a telephone equipment has
a different acquisition date, discounted prices apply. Two pieces of information are helpful in
this situation. On the one hand, the customer may buy or rent his telephones on the French
HTE market, renting being only practised by the historic company. On the other hand, we
know from the survey whether the household's equipment is recent (i.e., roughly less than one
year) or old.
Denote by jf  the sale price or the annual renting fee of telephone j. This variable is an
average price provided by the marketing institute, GFK.16 An actualization issue prevents the
direct use of this price in the model.
Define the indicator variable jl  that is equal to one (l j = 1) if telephone model j is
proposed for renting and is equal to zero (0=jl ) if it is proposed for sale. First, consider the
case of recent equipment. If jf  is the sale price or the annual renting fee of telephone j, th n
its cost is ( ) jj f11 rl+  where 1r , a parameter to be estimated, is introduced so that one can
compare renting or sale of this telephone on an equal footing. In particular, this parameter
accounts for the net effect between the expected costs of pursuing the renting contract and the
ones of maintaining the telephone (when it has been bought). Hence, for new equipment
( )j k, , the total cost is
( ) ( ) kkjjNjk ffF 11 11 rlrl +++= , (14)
                                            
15 The quality and price of a nil phone are normalised to zero.
16 One should differentiate the transaction price from the average price 
j
f , like for nstance the special discount that the
consumer has obtained from his/her shopkeeper. We account for this second measurement through the measurement error
njk
e .
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where N stands for "New".
Now, consider the case of an "Old" equipment. The discounted cost today of a
telephone j bought at some point in the past, is approximated by ( ) jf21 r+  where jf  is its
present sale price. It is approximated by ( )31 r+ jf  when it is rented and jf  is its annual rental
cost. Then, the total cost of an old equipment is
( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )[ ]F f fjkO j j j k k k= - + + + + - + + +1 1 1 1 1 12 3 2 3l r l r l r l r . (15)
Note that equation (14) is equivalent to equation (15) if 02 =r  and 13 rr = . In other words,
there is a normalization which allows us to designate a new equipment.
Parameters 1, 2r , and 3r  are function of the equipment duration, the interest rate, or
the individual discount rate. One expects 1r  and 3r  to be positive since they are basically
rates of change between buying or renting. While 2r  shou d be negative in general, it may turn
out to be positive if prices of telephones decreases more drastically than the consumer price
index.
Summing up, the total cost of any equipment ( )kj,  is given by
( )F F Fnjk n jkN n jkO= + -g g1 , (16)
where the variable g n  takes value 0 if the equipment is old, i.e., if the household owns it since
a long time, and value 1 if it is recent. The cost Fnjk of an equipment ( )j k,  hold by the
household n, is indexed by n as it is function of exogenous decisions of the household.17
The individual valuation for equipment
Assume that the individual valuation of the intrinsic quality of an equipment results
from the personal characteristics of its owner and the product attributes. Given the preceding
notations, we propose to specify this individual valuation according to the function
( )( )jkjknnjk xyqz ++º ln1 , (17)
where the term jkx encompasses all product or market attributes that could affect the quality
of the product (and so its demand) without affecting its usage. In particular, it is aimed at
taking into account market characteristics in the demand model. Assume that kjjk xxx +=  and
specify
jGjG
G
g
jggj Rddd 21
1
++
=
++= å ltx , (18)
where G is the number of firms present on the market, ( ) 2G1,...,1  and  , ++= ddd GGgg  are parameters
to estimate, t jg  equals 1 if telephone j is proposed for sale by firm g et 0 otherwise, l j equals
                                            
17 The variable g
n
 must be viewed as an exogenous variable in our static model even if it should result from a household
choice in a dynamic framework.
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1 if telephone j is proposed for renting and 0 otherwise, and Rj  equals 1 if telephone j is new
on the market and 0 otherwise.
Note that the component jx  has no direct link with the telephone usage and should not
be confused with the quality index, which enters the consumption function. The first term in
equation (18) is a classic way to introduce the reputation of firms in the demand model. The
term jGd l 1+  is used to account for two potential disequilibrium effects. First, at the survey
date, all households may not be equally and perfectly informed on the new rules of the HTE
market after deregulation started. Second, there could be some inertia in the household
behavior, in part because of the customer loyalty vis-à-vis the historic company. Recall that the
renting contract, only proposed by this firm, offers a free maintenance service, which could be
perceived as a sign of quality. Finally, the last term on the RHS of equation (18) measures the
effect of launching new brands on the market.
Neglecting the function given in equation (17) may result in implausible values for
model parameters or counterintuitive effects. It has a very sensitive role for the quality of
estimates. Note that it is a way to control for the end gen ity of prices, which could occur
when one omits to account for the fact that firms determines their marketing strategies by
observing consumer tastes on the quality of their products. Knowing that the analyst does not
have the same information set than the firms, the introduction of product-specific dummies in
the model could care the pain. This solution requires many observations per product, which is
not our case. The alternative is to use observable control variables as here or as in Goldberg
(1995).
The set of marketed phones
The set E of all equipment that consumers hold must be precisely defined. It must take
into account all models of telephones sold or rented in 1992, and also those models that are
not sold anymore (but still hold by consumers). For this purpose, we include the most
representative old models (in terms of market shares) in order to avoid an overestimation of
the stock shares of the most recent telephone models. Hence, our final set E is built from
symmetric combinations of the 158 different models of telephone (including the nil phone).
4.3. Estimates
Parameter estimates are gathered in Table 1. After several experiments comprising
different sets of exogenous variables, we report an estimation for which all parameters (except
one) are strongly significant. Since the mean log-likelihood is equal to –12.0626 and the mean
log-likelihood when all parameters are set to 0 (except s  s t to 1) is equal to -40.3631. The
pseudo 2R  is then equal to 0.701.
Hausman and McFadden (1984) provide a test of IIA in the case of multinomial logi
models. It is not directly applicable in our case for two reasons. First, we must account for the
continuous part in our likelihood function. Second, the test is based on the comparison to zero
of the difference between the estimator obtained with the full choice set and another one based
on an arbitrarily reduced set of alternatives. Our estimation strategy is precisely built in order
to avoid using the full choice set. The appropriate test for our case is left to further research.
Here, we just check that two estimators based on two different reduced choice sets randomly
drawn give similar results, i.e., provide similar predictions for the product shares.
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Table 1: Estimation of model parameters
Model parameters Variable acronyms Estimates Standard errors t-ratios
Heterogeneity index, q Constant 6.9106 0.2341 29.520
cq’s URBA1 0.1946 0.0437 4.452
URBA2 0.1540 0.0355 4.335
URBA3 0.0821 0.0424 1.937
NUMB 0.0259 0.0102 2.525
SES1 0.2095 0.0535 3.918
SES2 0.1828 0.0439 4.168
SES3 0.0974 0.0418 2.328
MINIT 0.2436 0.0352 6.913
Marginal utility of income, hINC1 0.0025 0.0007 3.710
mi’s INC2 0.0021 0.0006 3.329
INC3 0.0021 0.0006 3.308
INC4 0.0017 0.0006 2.812
Quality index, y OB 0.0017 0.0004 4.341
al’s TB 0.0017 0.0004 4.459
CD 0.0021 0.0004 4.769
AW 0.0019 0.0004 4.220
MEM 0.0000 0.0000 1.784
AMPL 0.0001 0.0000 2.270
AFFIC 0.0002 0.0001 2.006
NMD 0.0001 0.0001 0.957
VOL 0.0001 0.0001 2.236
Equipment cost, F              r1 2.2947 0.9467 2.424
r2 0.2546 0.1107 2.298
r3 3.1976 1.1682 2.737
Equipment valuation, z France Telecom 0.2568 0.0320 8.022
dg’s Philips 0.1410 0.0292 4.835
Alcatel 0.0592 0.0314 1.886
Matra 0.1811 0.0245 7.400
d5 0.6387 0.0552 11.570
d6 -0.3570 0.0880 -4.068
Other parameters               m 0.8150 0.0827 9.856
s 0.5390 0.0091 59.080
b 470.9400 107.5300 4.379
Note: Standard errors are obtained from the consistent-heteroskedastic matrix of White
Comparing our joint model with a simpler model omitting the continuous choice would
also be of interest. However, the discrete part of our model is not identifiable from the data.
Note that, as the estimated value of s  is relatively small, the continuous part of the model is
meaningful. Moreover, as the estimated value of m  is large, the variance of the e ’s tends to
become small, so that the discrete choice model is informative.
What do the other results teach us on the microeconomic behavior of households?
First, the effects of s cio-demographic variables on telephone consumption agree with the
common intuition. The higher is the population density in the area where the household lives,
the lengthier is the duration of telephone usage. This result should be interpreted as an
indicator of the presence of a network effect. Similarly, the larger the size of household, the
higher the telephone usage. Note that white collars have a higher consumption than blue
collars. Finally, the ownership of a teletex terminal also increases consumption.
Second, as expected, for each individual, the marginal utility of uméraire is positive
and decreasing with the class of income level. Moreover, individual price elasticities of
telephone consumption (i.e., ¶ ¶ bln lnx p h pn n= - ) are negative and increasing in absolute
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value with the class of income level.18 Our estimates of these elasticities of telephone usage are
higher than ones published in previous empirical studies. It is probably because most of these
studies use aggregate panel data and thus provides short-run elasticities. On the opposite, our
static model should reflect long run changes in consumption.19
Third, the results provide evidence on the usual issues of differentiation, namely, on
how customers value the different products and are able to substitute among telephone models.
Parameters of product attributes are all positive. Thus, for any individual n, the marginal utility
of any attribute l (i.e., ( )( ) ( ) 0ln1exp >++- nlnjknl apha qybq ) is positive when computed at
the estimated value, which is an indirect test of a right specification. Given the estimated
parameters, the quality of a telephone (or the contribution of its attributes to the utility) is
essentially measured by its type, the effect of each other characteristic being much lower. So,
vertical differentiation is mainly driven by the telephone type, which distinguishes market
segments, while the other characteristics of telephone models play a role within each market
segment, introducing by this way a sense of horizontal differentiation.
Fourth, concerning the equipment cost, parameters ’s are ordered as
0 2 1 3< < <r r r . From the definition of the cost of equipment provided above, the parameters
r1, r 2  and r 3 are associated with three cases: A telephone recently rented, bought or rented
a long time ago, respectively. (Recall that the parameter associated with a recent acquisition is
normalized to zero). That 2r  is positive is probably due to the large decrease of the average
price level of telephone compared to the evolution of the cost of living. That 3r  is greater than
1r  is trivial in the sense that a longer period of renting corresponds to a higher cost.
Fifth, several remarks can be made on the determinants of the individual valuation of
equipment. As expected, customers assign a positive value to telephones bought from the
biggest firms (Alcatel, France Telecom, Philips, and Matra) compared to other competitors on
the market whose effect is normalized at zero. It is the result of combined effects: Reputation
of firms or loyalty of consumers. Note that France Telecom has the highest grade followed by
Matra, Philips and Alcatel in a decreasing order. (See values of parameters 1d  to 4d .)
Moreover, French customers would associate a higher valuation to renting than to buying a
telephone. (See value of parameter 5d .) As there is no objective reason for this fact, this effect
is either due to the lack of information of households on the new rules after deregulation,
either due to the strong support for renting France Telecom’s telephones, which provides free
replacement for out-of-order telephones. Finally, a new telephone model has a lower valuation
than an old brand, because all customers at the survey date do not know it. (See value of
parameter 6d .)
The preceding remarks are heuristic proofs of the robustness of our econometric model
that can be now used to analyze the conduct on the market.
                                            
18 For confidentiality reasons, these elasticities are not reported.
19 See Blundell, Pashardes and Weber (1993) on the reliability of estimates of price coefficients in demand models when
one uses different levels of aggregation.
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5. MARKET ANALYSIS
All ingredients are now available to derive market shares and to compute price
elasticities and markups.
5.1. Stock and market shares
Recall that, as the survey bears on the household equipment, the model provides the
shares of each telephone brand in the whole stock. If tnjkPˆ  is the estimate at the survey period t
(namely, 1992) of the choice probability njkP  defined in equation (7), then the stock share of
equipment ( )kj,  in this period is
å
=
=
N
n
t
njk
t
jk PN
s
1
ˆ1ˆ , (19)
and the stock of product j is obtained as
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where *tC  is the set of all telephones in 1992 including the nil phone and the old models still
owned by consumers. The total number of households in the French population À  is equa  to
23.92 millions, which is assumed to be constant in the sequel.
We estimate the size of the total stock to be equal to 37.19 millions of telephones hold
by French households in 1992, while France Telecom officially estimates it at 34.93 millions.
Rented telephones represents 47.43 percent of this estimated stock, namely, 17.64 millions of
telephones. France Telecom estimates this proportion of rented telephones to be 52 percent in
1992. According to our model, each household owns and/or rents 1.55 telephone. For France
Telecom, this average level of equipment is evaluated at 1.46 telephone per household while
the marketing institute, Demoscopie, estimates it at 1.65. The fit of our estimated model is
fairly satisfactory.
Table 2 provides stock shares of telephones in 1992. Since there are too many
telephone models, only aggregate shares at the segment level are reported. Note that the shares
are computed on the estimated total stock after having excluded the stock of rented
telephones. As the estimated stock shares well mimic the observed shares given in Table 3, the
model is also able to provide a good approximation of the variability in the market.
Now, as the set of prices in 1991 (called period t-1) is available, we can estimate the
stocks in 1991. For this purpose, define * 1-tC  the set of marketed models in 1991 (where
products appeared in 1992 are excluded). At the estimated value of parameters, the choice
probabilities, namely 1ˆ -tnjkP , are computed in applying equation (7) to the set 
*
1-tC  and the 1991
prices. Then, the stock 1ˆ -tjS  of product 
*
1-Î tCj  is derived in using the estimated probabilities
1ˆ -t
njkP  in equations (19) and (20). Finally, an estimate of sales ˆ jD  f te phone 
*
tCj Î  during
period t can be readily obtained by computing
1ˆˆˆ --= tj
t
jj SSD . (21)
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Table 2: Telephone equipment of French households: Estimated stock shares in percent
Market segment
Firms
One-block
OB
Two-block
TB
Cordless
CD
Answering
AW
All segments
France Telecom 0.62 28.60 2.90 1.27 33.39
Matra 6.66 14.70 3.02 0.95 25.33
Philips 6.34 3.01 1.37 1.44 12.15
Alcatel 4.03 5.72 0.85 0.53 11.13
Modulophone 2.05 5.39 0.18 0.26 7.87
Comoc 0.62 4.16 4.78
HPF 0.98 1.88 2.86
Téfal 1.01 0.75 1.77
Radialva 0.00 0.62 0.62
Dialatron 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.10
All firms 22.41 64.83 8.30 4.46 100.00
Notes: - An empty cell means that the firm is not present on the corresponding market segment.
- The stock does include rented telephones
Table 3: Telephone equipment of French households: Observed stock shares in percent
Market segment
Firms
One-block
OB
Two-block
TB
Cordless
CD
Answering
AW
All segments
France Telecom 2.72 27.81 4.00 1.16 35.69
Matra 8.34 10.90 4.13 1.33 24.70
Philips 4.58 3.35 3.09 3.06 14.08
Alcatel 4.00 4.31 1.80 1.19 11.30
Modulophone 1.24 2.56 0.21 0.47 4.49
Comoc 2.54 2.20 4.74
HPF 0.72 0.97 1.69
Téfal 1.21 0.59 1.80
Radialva 0.00 0.40 0.40
Dialatron 0.71 0.24 0.16 1.11
All firms 26.07 53.32 13.40 7.21 100.00
Note: All figures are obtained from the marketing institute GFK.
Table 4: Telephone equipment of French households: Estimated market shares in percent
Market segment
Firms
One-block
OB
Two-block
TB
Cordless
CD
Answering
AW
All segments
France Telecom 4.20 25.58 7.11 1.99 38.88
Matra 6.21 8.27 8.54 1.77 24.79
Philips 5.97 2.81 2.45 2.57 13.80
Alcatel 4.44 1.91 2.14 0.91 9.40
Modulophone 0.89 2.76 0.22 0.70 4.57
Comoc 0.40 2.57 2.98
HPF 0.71 2.77 3.47
Téfal 0.85 0.42 1.27
Radialva 0.16 0.16
Dialatron 0.67 0.00 0.67
All firms 24.35 47.26 20.46 7.94 100.00
Table 5: Telephone equipment of French households: Observed market shares in percent
Market segment
Firms
One-block
OB
Two-block
TB
Cordless
CD
Answering
AW
All segments
France Telecom 7.92 23.73 5.73 3.25 40.63
Matra 7.50 10.29 4.79 2.26 24.84
Philips 4.22 2.39 4.24 2.65 13.50
Alcatel 3.18 4.02 2.46 1.08 10.74
Modulophone 0.21 0.82 0.55 0.08 1.66
Comoc 2.14 1.71 3.85
HPF 0.21 0.29 0.50
Téfal 0.88 0.64 1.52
Radialva 0.20 0.20
Dialatron 1.90 0.66 2.56
All firms 28.16 44.75 17.77 9.32 100.0
Note: All figures are obtained from the marketing institute GFK.
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If product j is new, tjj SD ˆˆ = . Of course equation (21) applies only to products that are sold in
period t. Note that for all products sold in 1992, our estimated demands turn out to be
positive.
The model predicts a volume of total sales up to 2.88 millions of telephones. This
number should be compared to the estimation of 3.06 millions telephones sold in 1992,
according to GFK. Table 4 provides the 1992 estimated market shares as percent of total sales
by market segment and firm, while observed shares are given in Table 5. Again we observe that
the model behaves quite well. These simulations permit also to analyze the renting side of the
market. In 1992, the stock of rented telephones has increased slightly by 2.3 percent from a
stock of 17.25 millions in 1991. However, as the estimated proportion of rented telephones
decreases from 50.86 percent in 1991 to 47.43 in 1992, our estimate agrees with the facts as
reported by marketing experts.
5.2. Price lasticities
As explained in Section 2, the structure of the utility function does not impose
unrealistic substitution patterns of aggregate demands. This can be easily checked by a glance
at Table 6 that displays the own and cross-price ela tic ti s of demand for some models of
telephone. The elasticity of product j’s demand with respect to the 1992 price of product q is
computed according to ( )( )( )1ˆ ˆ ˆˆln ln t t tj q q j j j qD f f S S S f¶ ¶ ¶-¶ = - . On average, individuals
perform substitution among products that provide them with comparable level of utility. As the
type of a product plays an important role in the discrete choice, products are generally more
substitutable within segments. For instance, the cross-elasticities on the two-block segment are
between 3 and 5 percent while they are lower with telephones of other segments. Note also
that the own price elasticities increase (resp. decrease) with the quality (price) of telephones.
Own and cross-price elasticities on stocks (not reported here) can also be computed.
They are less sensitive to prices while they follow a similar path of substitution as the own and
cross-price elasticities of market shares.
Table 6: Own and cross-price elasticities
AW1 AW1 CD1 CD2 CD3 OB1 OB2 OB3 OB4 OB5 OB6 TB1 TB2 TB3 TB4 TB5 TB6
AW1 -38.5 1.99 1.02 0.96 1.23 0.19 0.2 0.27 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.27 0.16 0.14 0.21 0.18 0.2
AW2 1.99 -38.67 1.01 0.95 1.22 0.18 0.2 0.29 0.18 0.14 0.17 0.26 0.15 0.14 0.2 0.17 0.19
CD1 1.38 1.36 -34.59 1.64 1.75 0.1 0.12 0.15 0.1 0.08 0.1 0.16 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.11
CD2 1.23 1.22 1.71 -33.94 1.68 0.08 0.1 0.13 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.08
CD3 1.02 1.05 1.48 1.48 -52.73 0.13 0.15 0.33 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.22 0.15 0.13 0.18 0.16 0.18
OB1 0.22 0.24 0.026 0.08 0.1 -153.1 8.59 8.51 8.39 7.99 7.28 2.48 1.79 1.69 2.06 1.93 1.99
OB2 0.21 0.31 0.024 0.06 0.09 7.31 -258.4 6.37 9.25 6.85 9.14 2.37 1.67 1.58 1.95 1.82 1.87
OB3 0.23 0.13 0.026 0.12 0.21 8.54 8.68 -142.4 8.48 8.08 5.37 3.55 1.86 1.76 3.13 1.89 2.06
OB4 0.2 0.2 0.024 0.11 0.19 8.2 8.75 4.26 -219.5 7.74 8.03 2.28 1.59 1.49 1.86 1.73 1.79
OB5 0.17 0.08 0.022 0.051 0.18 7.68 8.12 7.03 7.91 -148.8 7.8 2.6 1.41 1.31 2.68 1.55 1.61
OB6 0.09 0.19 0.022 0.1 0.19 8.05 10.19 7.11 7.99 7.58 -233.8 2.16 1.46 1.37 1.74 1.61 1.66
TB1 0.26 0.27 0.034 0.03 0.14 2.6 2.57 2.63 1.52 1.41 1.46 -119.1 3.63 3.58 3.77 3.7 3.73
TB2 0.19 0.18 0.052 0.12 0.13 2.25 2.22 1.28 1.17 1.06 1.11 3.93 -87.2 3.23 2.42 3.35 3.39
TB3 0.17 0.16 0.07 0.11 0.29 1.2 1.18 1.24 1.12 1.02 1.07 3.59 3.23 -77.58 2.38 3.3 3.34
TB4 0.22 0.25 0.04 0.08 0.14 2.69 2.36 2.42 1.31 1.2 1.25 3.77 3.42 3.36 -116.5 3.49 3.52
TB5 0.2 0.33 0.09 0.14 0.32 1.13 1.04 1.36 0.95 1.14 1.19 3.71 3.36 3.72 3.5 -72.87 3.46
TB6 0.2 0.21 0.038 0.015 0.05 3.34 2.32 3.58 2.26 1.16 1.21 4.73 2.38 2.32 4.63 3.44 -132.3
Price 1413 1386 1450 1363 894 282 157 309 185 273 171 369 459 586 353 576 304
Note: Cell entries (i.j). where i indexes row and j column, give the percentage change in market share of i wit  a
change in the price of j by an amount of FF 50. The last row gives the 1992 prices in French Francs of the
products.
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5.3. Market equilibrium
Provided that we adopt assumptions on marginal cost structure and on the conduct of
firms, we are able to compute markups from the estimated demand system. Assume that, for a
given commodity produced by a given firm, the marginal cost is constant and independent of
marginal costs of other products proposed by this firm. Moreover, assume that each firm plays
a Nash strategy in prices. These assumptions are relaxed in Foncel (1998).
Consider a firm g that provides the set of telephones gW  i  1992. Its strategy consists
of choosing prices ( )
gjj
f
WÎ
 of its products given the prices of competitors.20 Note that the set
of all products and their attributes are exogenous. Assume that the marginal cost of product j
can be written jjj mcmc w+=  where jmc  is the deterministic part of marginal cost (which is
a function of product attributes and parameters) and where the component jw  is not
observable for the econometrician and probably correlated with unobserved quality. Firm g
maximizes expected profits, i.e., solves
( )
( ) ( )( )
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
++-å
WÎWÎ
jj
j
jjj
f
fDmcfEMax
ggj
j
cw ˆ , (22)
where ( )fD jˆ  is the estimated demand for product j, which depends on the vector f of p oduct
prices (and on all other exogenous variables that are omitted for convenience), and jc  is a
random term relative to product j, related to the non observable attributes of this product, in
particular the unobservable perceived quality. This last term is introduced to represent what it
is not explained by the model. Recall that, when prices are correlated with unobservable
attributes of products (i.e., with a term like jc ) on the demand side, there is a potential
problem of endogeneity, which may prevent to find a correct solution to the first order
conditions associated with the program defined by equation (22). Neglecting this endogeneity
problem has statistical implications when one estimates a system of demand and supply with
aggregate data. As already noticed by Goldberg (1995), this problem is alleviated when
demand and supply are estimated sequentially on micro data as here. Indeed, because of our
specification, our estimated demands account correctly for the perceived quality of products by
the consumers. Hence it is reasonable to assume that jc  is not correlated with the
unobservable perceived quality, and hence not correlated with jw  (or that the correlation
between jc  and jw  is negligible). Then, a good approximation of the program solved by firm
g is
( )
( ) ( )fDmcfMax j
j
jj
f
ggj
j
ˆå
WÎ
-
WÎ
. (23)
                                            
20 The operator France Telecom has an asymmetric role in this game. We assume here that its choice concerning the price
of telecommunications is not related to the competition on the differentiated product market. Its strategy can be analyzed
conditionally to the given tariff of telecommunications.
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This leads to the first order condition21
( ) ( ) ( )
ˆ
ˆ 0 ,
g
r
j r r g
r j
D f
D f f mc j
f
¶
¶ÎW
+ - = " Î Wå . (24)
Define by D  a J J´  matrix whose element (i.j) is such that ( ) jiij ffD ¶¶ ˆ=D , with J  the
number of products. Let E be the J J´  matrix with generic element (i.j) such that E ij = 1 if
products i and j are produced by the same firm and 0 otherwise. In matrix notations, equations
(24) is written
( ) ( )( ) 0'.ˆ =-E*D+ mcffD . (25)
where the operator .*  defines the element-by-element matrix multiplication and mc s the
vector of marginal costs.
Assuming that D E'.*  is invertible, the vector of markups evaluated at the observed
prices is obtained as
( ) ( )fDMK ˆ'. 1-E*D-= . (26)
For some models of telephone, Table 7 provides the associated markup, this markup as a
percent of the price and the profit (expressed in millions of French Francs) which is simply the
markup times the estimated sales.
At the segment level, the average ratio of markups to prices are equal to 31.46 percent
for answering telephones, 34.09 percent for cordless telephones, 19.03 percent for two-blocks
type and 15.27 percent for one-block type. These numbers seems high although the pattern is
plausible and agrees with a common feature of differentiated products markets: The higher the
ratios, the higher the quality.
Concerning profits now (see last column of Table 7), note that products in segments
with an intensive competition in terms of number of products (like OB and TB) are generally
associated with lower level of profits than the other segments (CD and AW). While it is often
observed in market studies that high markups come with small market shares, here they are
combined with relatively large market shares. In our case, demand for high-quality products is
rising while competition is not so fierce since the market is just experiencing deregulation and
the number of sophisticated telephone models remains limited. After 1992, many new high-
quality models appear (like telephones with both answering and cordless functions) and prices
decreased significantly.
The most striking result is the very large profit generated by the two-blocks RONDO
which was a very popular telephone and which was also proposed for renting from 1993. Table
8 below confirms the leadership of France Telecom, Matra and Philips in terms of profits as in
terms of shares. Note that the high quality segments are very profitable (especially the cordless
one).
                                            
21 Checking that second order conditions hold ensures that estimated parameters are consistent with the existence of the
equilibrium even if unicity is not guaranteed (see also Berry, Levinshon and Pakes, 1998, Feenstra and Levinshon, 1995,
Petrin, 1999).
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Table 7: Estimated markups and profits by model of telephone
Brand Model Type Price % Markup Markup Profits
MATRA RIP30 AW 1413.84 31.34 443.10 6.73
PHILIPS TD9460C AW 1386.26 34.90 483.80 6.95
MATRA AMPLITE CD 1450.43 36.55 530.13 5.88
ALCATEL DAYTONR CD 1363.80 31.20 425.51 2.39
PHILIPS TD9230 CD 894.93 28.20 252.37 4.45
ALCATEL SURFMEM OB 282.38 16.88 47.67 1.19
COMOC DAND101 OB 157.01 13.11 20.58 0.24
MATRA VOILE10 OB 309.64 16.13 49.94 2.33
MODULOPHONE MP2020T OB 185.19 12.82 23.74 0.68
TEFAL COMPAC2 OB 273.96 12.84 35.18 0.49
DIALATON SCANDAS OB 171.45 13.09 22.44 0.24
FRANCE TELECOM DUO TB 369.39 22.73 83.96 7.68
FRANCE TELECOM RONDO TB 459.00 24.36 111.81 8.70
MATRA ADVENT1 TB 586.77 26.71 156.73 2.35
MATRA CONTACP TB 353.37 21.86 77.25 1.38
MATRA TM1 TB 576.30 26.83 154.62 3.51
MODULOPHONE DYNASTM TB 304.55 18.53 56.43 0.17
Table 8: Estimated profits by segment and by firm
Market segment
Firms
One-block
OB
Two-block
TB
Cordless
CD
Answering
AW
All segments
France Telecom 9.81 79.93 44.83 22.26 156.83
Matra 8.23 28.37 62.17 22.23 121.00
Philips 8.82 12.34 40.42 43.62 105.20
Alcatel 5.93 10.48 13.70 8.44 38.55
Modulophone 1.48 6.11 1.29 2.39 11.27
Comoc 0.24 6.06 6.30
HPF 0.82 3.83 4.65
Téfal 0.84 0.66 1.50
Radialva 0.40 0.40
Dialatron 0.57 0.57
All firms 36.74 148.18 162.41 98.94 446.27
Note: Unit is million of French Francs.
Finally, look at the profits of the historic operator on its rented products as given in
Table 9. Clearly, renting produces a lot of profits for France Telecom. Total profits for the
period based on the stock of five rented products amount to 682.29 millions of French Francs
whereas the aggregate annual profits on sales (with 134 products) is around 446.27 millions.
This may explain the toughness of competition after 1992.
Table 9: France Telecom’s profits on renting
Models
Markup Stock Profits
S63 21.00 6.51 136.84
ALTO 34.88 3.71 129.43
CHORUS 82.50 1.65 136.43
FIDELIO 79.45 1.65 131.39
DIGITEL 36.12 4.10 148.20
Note: Unit is million of French Francs.
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6- REMARKS AND EXTENSIONS
This study provides, using a direct utility approach, a structural analysis of the demand
of telephone usage and equipment choice in a static setting. Based on survey data, our model
explains how the stock of telephones results from consumer choices. It fits for the main
features of durable goods. Different problems are addressed, from the dimensionality of the
choice set, the definition of prices in a static approach and the characterization of vertical and
horizontal differentiation, to the correctness of substitution patterns, and the question of the
different distribution strategies (selling or renting). This is particularly useful in marketing
studies that are aimed at defining product and price strategies according to the actual marketed
products but also according to products yet in the stock. In some sense, our model accounts
for the fact that durable goods create their own competition. It could be easily applied to
similar instances like cellular phones. However, it is also relevant for various markets, like the
software market where the installed base plays a crucial role.
Several by-products of this analysis can be developed. First, one can estimate marginal
costs for each product as a function of observable attributes of products and one can avoid the
assumption of constant marginal costs. Second, one can test for the conduct of firms. Most
applications posit a Nash assumption except Gasmi, Laffont, Vuong (1992) and Feenstra and
Levinshon (1995). Testing for different firm behavior is crucial in order to compute correct
markups. (See Foncel, 1998.) Finding the relevant equilibrium concept should also be required
in order to measure the effect of new products on welfare as in P trin (1999) or to analyze
mergers or anti-competitive practices from an antitrust point of view.
The main advantage of our approach lies in the use of micro data. This explains the
richness and also the complexity of the econometric modeling. Methodological extensions of
our mixed continuous-discrete choice model are on the research agenda. For instance, one
could develop a framework that enables us to estimate simultaneously demand and supply
along the line of Berry, Levinshon and Pakes (1998). One would like also to address the
question of the joint choice of quality and price, while here quality is considered as given.
Finally, this study also tells us that, although our static setting turns out to be quite fruitful,
econometrics of differentiated durable goods markets should greatly benefit from a true
dynamic approach.
APPENDIX 1: Proof of Proposition 1
The first task is to define the market share for any product. Denoting by jks  the market share of
equipment (j,k), we have that
å
=
=
N
n
njkjk PN
s
1
1
, (A1.1)
where njkP  is defined in equation (7). If À  is the number of households in the population, the total
demand for equipment (j,k) is jkjk sS À= . Now, taking into account the symmetry of alternatives, the
total stock for product j is 
*
j jj jk
k C
S S S
Î
= + å , where *C  is the set C of all telephones to which one
adds the nil telephone. The market share of product j is then å
Î
=
Cj
jjj SSs
'
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Now we compute the cross price-elasticity of product j with respect of product q. We have the following
expressions (for a given n)
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This can be rewritten
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As this expression depends on j, the result is proved. By the same token, own-price elasticities can be
computed. (See Foncel, 1997.)
APPENDIX 2: Proof of Proposition 2
i) The joint probability ( )nnmn DxE ,,Pr  of drawing a level of usage nx , a subset nD  and an
alternative which is known to belong to the group mnE , is given by
( ) ( ) ( ){ } { } { }
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However,
( ) ( ) ( )nnnnn xkjxkjDDxkj ,,Pr,,Pr,,,Pr = .
Given the sampling procedure, the way alternatives are selected is independent of the
consumption level. So we have ( ) ( )kjDxkjD nnn ,Pr,,Pr = . By Bayes' theorem,
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xkjkjD
Dxkj
Pr
,,Pr,Pr
,,Pr = .
However,
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
dxPxkjDD
x Ekj
njknjknn ò å
Î
=
,
,PrPr f ,
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where, based on our notations, we use that ( ) ( ) njknjk Pxxkj f=,,Pr . From Assumptions 2 and 3, we
have
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which leads to the expression of the likelihood function given in equation (10).
ii) Now consider the limit problem of the log-likelihood function in equation (10)
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where v  denotes the vector of all exogenous variables of an individual and 1G  and 2G  re two subsets
of parameters to be estimated such that { }mUU 21 GG=G . Define
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The limit problem can be written
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LEMMA 1 (Manski and McFadden, 1981): Let ( )G,sB  be a real value function over a space
W´S  such that B is integrable with respect to a measure H  over S and ( ) 0, ³GsB , all WÎGÎ ,Ss .
Let 0G  be an element of W  such that ( ) 0, 0 >GsB  for almost every SsÎ  and
( ) ( )( ) WÎG³G-Gò allfordHsBsB
s
,0,, 0 .
Then the expression ( ) ( )( )dHsBsB
s
ò G-G ,, 0  attains its maximum at 0G=G . The maximum is unique
if, for every WÎG  such that 0G¹G , there exists SS ÌG  such that ( ) ( )dHsBdHsB SS òò GG G¹G
0,, .
LEMMA 2: Suppose that ( )zyfy
y
,maxarg0 =  and ( ) 0,0 >zyq , all z ZÎ . Then the
expression ( ) ( )ò
z
dHzyfzyq ,,0  attains its maximum at y y= 0.
PROOF: Suppose ( ) ( )ò=
z
y
dHzyfzyqy ,,maxarg 01 . Then,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )òò ³
zz
dHzyfzyqdHzyfzyq ,,,, 0010 , and ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 0,,, 010ò ³-
z
dHzyfzyfzyq .
This implies that there exists ZzÎ  such that ( ) ( )zyfzyf ,, 01 ³  which contradicts the assumption.
From Lemma 1, the expression ( ) ( )dxmDxvBmDxvBM
m x
GGåò
=
;,,,ln;,,,
1
0  attains its maximum
at 0G=G , for all ( )vD, . It is just required to take an appropriate measure composed by a Lebe gue
measure over x and a discrete one over m. From Lemma 2, consistency is achieved by taking the
appropriate measure over D and v.
APPENDIX 3: Variable definitions
A3.1. Individual variables
All these variables enter the heterogeneity index, q .
URBA1 : takes value 1 if the household lives in a city with a population size larger than 1,000,000
inhabitants and 0 otherwise.
URBA2 : takes value 1 if the household lives in a city with a population size between 100,000 and
1,000,000 inhabitants and 0 otherwise.
URBA3 : takes value 1 if the household lives in a city with a population size between 20,000 and
100,000 inhabitants and 0 otherwise.
URBA4 : takes the value 1 if the household lives in a city with a population size lower than 100,000
inhabitants  or in a rural area (the parameter relative to this variable is normalised to 0).
NUMB : is the number of persons in the household.
SES1 : takes value 1 if the household head is an upper level white collar.
SES2 : takes value 1 if the household head is a lower level white collar.
SES3 : takes value 1 if the household head is a blue collar, a farmer or a craftsman.
SES4 : takes value 1 if the household head is unproductive or pensioned off (the parameter relative
to this variable is normalised to 0).
MINIT : takes value 1 if the household owns a teletext terminal.
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A3.2. Income variables
These variables correspond to vector ( )yi i I=1,...,  in the model.
INC1 : takes value 1 if household’s annual income y s l w r than FF 84,000.
INC2 : takes value 1 if household’s annual income is between FF 84,000 and FF 165,000.
INC3 : takes value 1 if household’s annual income is between FF 165,000 and FF 270,000.
INC4 : takes value 1 if household’s annual income is greater than FF 270,000.
3. Product variables
All these variables (i.e., the vector ( )bl l L=1,..., ) enter the quality index y .
OB : takes the value 1 if the telephone is made of one block and is not cordless.
TB : takes the value 1 if the telephone is made of two blocks and has not the answering function.
CD : takes the value 1 if the telephone is cordless.
AW : takes the value 1 if the telephone has the answering function.
MEM : number of available memories.
AMPL : takes the value 1 if possible to amplify the sound.
SCRE : takes the value 1 if possible to show the last telephone number dialed.
NMD : takes the value 1 if possible to dial directly.
VOL : takes the value 1 if possible to modulate listening.
APPENDIX 4: Descriptive statistics
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics on Individual Variables
Variables Mean Standard Error
INC1 0.293 0.455
INC2 0.407 0.491
INC3 0.196 0.397
INC4 0.104 0.306
URBA1 0.169 0.374
URBA2 0.265 0.441
URBA3 0.333 0.472
URBA4 0.233 0.423
NUMB 2.978 1.455
SES1 0.116 0.320
SES2 0.179 0.383
SES3 0.397 0.489
SES4 0.308 0.462
MINIT 0.251 0.434
Number of rented
phones by equipment (a ) 1.034 0.625
Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics on Product Variables
Variables Mean Standard Error
OB 0.213 0.410
TB 0.529 0.499
CD 0.147 0.354
AW 0.110 0.313
MEM 0.669 2.022
AMPL 0.397 0.489
SCRE 0.037 0.188
NMD 0.199 0.399
VOL 0.067 0.083
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Table A.3: Mean Prices in French Francs
Type of telephone Mean Standard Error
OB 265.40 28.55
TB 445.67 131.17
CD 1328.99 113.74
AW 1400.99 77.89
Whole market 642.50 469.69
Table A.4: Product Repartition by Brand and Type
OB TB AW CD
Alcatel 6 12 3 4
Comoc 1 12 0 0
Dialaton 2 0 0 0
FrTelecom 1 6 1 2
HPF 2 4 0 0
Matra 5 9 3 6
Modulophone 3 13 1 1
Philips 6 6 7 7
Radialva 0 2 0 0
Tefal 2 2 0 0
Note: Telephones rented by France Telecom are not included.
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